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RECENT CASES

requiring the docketing of a lispendens before it would be a notice to an
innocent purchaser, the final judgment remains unaffected by such a statute.
Thus Virginia takes the anomolous position that although specifically abbrogated by statute, the doctrine of Common Law Lis Pendens remains the
basis for the rule that judgment is of itself notice.
It is obvious that the existence of unrecorded and undocketed judgments
in actions to quiet title will not, as a practical matter, be apparent to a
lawyer searching the records unless the records of the court in which the
judgment was rendered are included within the scope of his search. It is
suggested that a search of such records would be extremely burdensome,
if not impossible, task for several reasons, some of which are:
(1) The concealed defect in the title under examination may crop up
anywhere in the entire chain of conveyances.
(2) The name of every grantor and grantee will apparently have to be
"run" in the court records, and the records in question are commonly not
kept in alphabetical order.
(3) May quiet title actions involve numerous defendants but only the
principal defendant's name appears in the captions by which the case
is listed for index purposes.
(4) The indexes which exist are net designed for the task of facilitating
a title search.
The effect of the decision is therefore to expose a serious defect in our
recording statutes. It is apparent that remedial legislation is necessary.
ROBERT L. MCCONN

TAXATION -

INCOME TAX -

LIQUIDATION

OF DISSOLVED CORPORATION BY

TRUST - Plaintiff, a trust which was originally created as a liquidation vehicle
for the assets of a dissolved corporation, was taxed by defendant, Collector of
Internal Revenue, as a corporation with its consequent higher tax rate.
In sustaining the lower court's affirmative decision for defendant's tax ruling
it was held, that activities of the trustees were demonstrative of an entrepenurial intent and of a commercial nature comprising more than mere incidents of liquidation. Anderson v. Lamb, 222 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1955).
Problems of determining whether trusts are, for the purposes of federal
taxation, business trusts or "associations", and hence taxable as corporations,'
have perplexed the courts ever since Hecht v. Malley.2 There, the Supreme
Court ruled that the trusts before them were business trusts or associations,
and subject to the tax levied upon corporations because their trustees were,
"associated together in much the same manner as directors in a corporation
for the purpose of carrying on business enterprises",' this being true
4
"independently of the large measures of control exercised by the beneficiaries".
The Circuit Court, although not citing Hecht v. Malley, joined with a
majority of the courts in ruling that control was not the primary test but
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§7701 (a) (b) Int. Rev. Code 1954, Public Law No. 591 (83rd Cong. 1954).
265 U.S. 144 (1924).
Ibid. at 161.
Ibid.
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that the "business enterprise" element was more revealing as to the actual
5
status of the trust or association.
Since the amount of control exercised over the trustees by the beneficiaries
is no longer controlling, two established guideposts remain: (1) The similarity
6
to a corproation, or formal "quasi-corporate structure" of the trust, and (2)
the "business enterprise" test. The formal characteristics are of secondary
importance, the important issue being whether the trust device is being used
7
by a group of individuals to carry on a business for profit. Thus courts must
necessarily probe into the history of a trust to detennine its exact character
when deciding a controversy identical or similar to that presented by the
instant case.8
0
In light of the Federal Revenue Act,!, as applied by the courts,1 how best
may the structure and functions of a liquidating trust be manipulated in
order to avoid a fate similar to that of the purported trust involved in tie
instant case? It is obvious that all liquidating trusts are not taxable as
"associations"."1 For example, the fact that trustees were empowered to
enter into oil leases did not require the holding that the trust was organized
for the purpose of carrying on a business.12 In another instance a trust was
not considered a business enterprise during the liquidation despite subdivision,
improvement and sale of property when it was shown such property was too
large for the market.It becomes apparent that the courts will allow the liquidating trustees a
reasonable latitude to avoid sacrifice in the disposal, but where the facts
show an aggressive continuation or enlargement of the business of the
dissolved corporation it will be correspondingly categorized by the court.
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5. Accord, Commissioner v. Vandegrift Realty & Invest. Co., 82 F.2d 387
1936); Trust No. 5833, Security-First National Bank v. Welch, 54 F.2d 323

1931) (dictum).
6. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 360 (1935)

(dictum)

(9th Cir.
(9th Cir.

(Five points of

similarity to a corporation: (1) title is held by trustees as a continuous body during life of
trust; (2) centralized management by trustees; (3) continuity or perpetual succession; (4)
transferable shares; and

(5)

limited liability)

(dictum).

7. Commissioner v. Vandegrift Reaity & Investment Co., 82 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1936).
8. See Nee v. Linwood Securities Co., 174 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1949) (To be taxable as
an association, the trust must (1) be initially created or have been thereafter utilized during
th? tax period involved, as a vehicle for carrynig on a business enterprise, and it must
(2) have characteristics under its written structure or in its adopted mode of operation
resembling a corporate organization.).

9. 48 Stat. 771 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 717a (1946).
10. Porter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 130 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1942). Also
See 2 Nossaman, Trust Administration & Taxation, §715. 267 (rev. ed., 1919). Stevqns,

Corporations, §7. 30 (2d. ed., 1949).
11. E.g., Fidelity

Nat.

37 B.T.A. 473 (1938)

Bank & Trust Co.

v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue,

(Trustees were required to collect and turn assets into money

and dis:rilute the same from time to time as rapidly as was possible and consistent with
the realization of fair prices therefor.)
12. Nee v. Linwood Securities Co., 174 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1949).
13. Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner Internal Revenue, 34 B.T.A. 1066 (1936).

